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of Jean-Claude Parrot
by Harry J. Glasbeek and Michael Mandel

The freedom to associate with whomever
one chooses, and to say and think whatever one believes, are rights which Canadians assume they possess. The Canadian
Bill of Rights specifically provides that
these rights are fundamental . to our
society, and politicians never tire of telling
us that we are among the freest of the
world's nations. The recent legal repression of the Canadian Union of Postal
Workers and the legal persecution of
Jean-Claude Parrot for adhering to his
belief were dramatie manifestations that
we live a lie. As lawyers we feel it is our
duty to show how the law has been used to
attack a legitimate association, and to attempt to discredit an honourable man.
When the federal legislature passed
the Postal Services Continuation Act on
17 October, 1978 which ordered the
striking employees back to work, it acted
within the scope of its legitimate power.
Until that moment CUPW had also acted
within the scope of its legitimate power. It
had been given the power to strike should
it fail to reach an agreement with the Post
Office by the very same legislature which
now ordered it not to strike.
In 1967, the federal legislature determined that federal public service employees should be given an opportunity to
participate in collective bargaining in
much the same way as citizens in the private sector do. This was a recognition that
the right to bargain collectively about
conditions of employment was highly
valued in society. Employees bargaining
as individuals do not have much clout. Inevitably they will seek to improve their
economic position by forming trade
unions. After long and often bitter struggles, Canadian legislatures set up sophisticated machinery to permit employees to
withhold their labour by agreement, the
only real economic !ever employees have.
Obviously, a collective decision was made
that some economic disruption had to be
tolerated because of the overriding need
to provide citizens with a legal self-help
remedy.
The federal legislature, no doubt
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recognizing the importance of this prin- months on the basis that, if forced to,
ciple to all Canadian people, passed the they could legitimately attempt to make
Public Service Staff Reldtions Act which their demand stick by withholding their
permlts federal public servants to form labour, and were then told that none of
trade unions which then have to choose this meant anything to the government of
whether they want to have their members' the day.
work conditions settled by (a) negotiaOf course, it is recognized that a
tions and, if this fails, by fiat of arbitra- democratic legislature, like all other lawtors, or (b) by bargaining in the same way makers, must be entitled to take the drasas the private sector does, that is, by nego- tic· action of reversing its earlier position
tiations and, if this fails, by the use of the (even if this means defeating the legitimate
strike weapon. CUPW made a democratic expectations and freedoms of citizens), if
decision to use the collective bargaining/ an emergency threatening life and limb or
strike route.
the very fabric of society warrants such a
The bargaining which led up to the reversal. It is in this sense that the governevents of 1978 was long and protracted. ment sought to justify its invocation of the
When it became /aJ-vfully possible to do
War Measures Act in 1970. But whatever
so, the union members met and by an doubts there now exist about the true state
overwhelming majority, in a freely-held of events surrounding that freedom-overvote, determined that, if no agreement riding legislation none can exist about the
was achieved by a specific date, they circumstances which surrounded the prowould exercise their lawfully obtained posed postal strike. Harmful to some peoright to strike. The government responded ple? Yes. Inconvenient to many? Yes. But
by saying, even before the due date, that it a danger to life and limb or to the very
would not tolerate any strike action and fabric of society? No.
Remember that the government took
would pass legislation to prevent such action by CUPW members. We have now its stand before there was, in fact, a strike_
come to the first instance of the betrayal and can therefore only have been acting
of the supposed freedoms of Canadian on the presumption that a catastrophe was
citizens. The legislature had granted the in the offing. J;iurthermore a strike could
right to strike to people such as the mem- arguably be crippling to the community if
bers of CUPW. It now publicly indicated it was a prolonged one and if it took place
that it had only pretended to give that in a truly essential sector of the economy.
right. Can one imagine the outcry which But there was no evidence on which the
would arise if the government passed government could have made a judgment
legislation to the effect that all people who that the expected strike was likely to be a
set up in business in the northern reaches long one and, when the strike began, the
of the country would, after 18 months of government did not wait to see whether or
such enterprise, be entitled to 10 acres of not it :would be) of a duration which would
la:nd and, when entitled people claimed present a danger to Canada's well-being;
their land, the government of the day were it instantly introduced the back-to-work
to pass legislation making its initial legislation. In any event, it is difficult
promise null and void? This is exactly · to argue that uninterrupted postal serwhat happened in the Post Office dispute vices are as important to our society as the
of 1978. The workers had organized them- alleged imperilling of society and security
selves on the basis of well and properly es- which called for the War Measures Act.
tablished legislation. They had organized
To further emphasize the lack of conin one way rather than another, had elect- sideration the government gave to the free
ed a leadership of one kind rather than an- exercise of citizens' rights in this episode,
other to help them in their chosen method note that Deputy-Minister Corkery, a witof bargaining, bargained for eighteen ness for the prosecution at the Parrot

trial, testified that throughout the lengthy
negotiation period the chief Post Office
negotiators were advising the government
that, even if the CUPW's leadership
called for a strike, there was little chance
of membership support for such a course
of action. It was on the basis of this miscalculation that the government took its
intransigent stand during negotiations and
permitted them to drag oh. It was in effect
saying: "We are not giving in to your demands because we think you are not
serious enough about them to go to the
limit of your resources. Therefore, we wiil
wait until you settle for less." This is a
perfectly valid attitude to maintain in the
collective bargaining process by an employer acting in good faith. But, if a strike
then ensues; the employer must accept the
cost of his decision. The government obviously never accepted the obligation of
doing that. As soon as it became apparent
·that the game was to be played to a logical
conclusion which it did not like, it
changed the game. The spirit behind its
· bargaining posture - whatever the letter
of the law says - was clearly bad faith.
This, then, is the tale of the first
aspect of the serious undermining of
social understanding revealed by the Post
:Office affair. The government, so keen on
telling us about our freedoms, used its

awesome legal power to undermine rights
and privileges without warning, without
need, without consultation, without appropriate public debate. This alone makes
the episode noteworthy: power had been
abused, although the use of the power was
- by the letter of the law - permissible.
The second aspect of the episode is
even more revealing than the first. It co.ncerns the precise nature of the Postal Services Continuation Act (Bill C-8), the
back-to-work law. The statute ordered the
CUPW members back to work on the
terms existing at the time the strike was
called (and which were acknowledged to
be no longer acceptable to both parties),
and appointed a mediator-conciliator to
settie the dispute. As the effect of this statute was to revive the expired collective
agreement, the union members were now
on strike during a collective agreement.
This automatically put them in breach of
that agreement and, therefore, the appropriate labour relations board could have
been asked to get them back to work. In
the normal course of events that labour
relations board would have been asked to
do so. Further, if the employer had
wished to punish recalcitrant employees,
penalties are provided for this in the main
governing statute, the Public Service Staff
Relations Act. But so intent was the government on punishing this union and these
workers, so venomous did it feel towards
people whose legal conduct it had rendered illegal by autocratic use of its power,
that in its back-to-work legislation it increased the penalties from the relatively
small fixed amounts of $100 to $300, to
potentially unlimited ones.
The workers' obligation arising out
of Bill C-8 was merely to go back to work.
The leadership of CUPW had been given
an additional burden. On previous occasions, the government in back-to-work
legislation (for example, the Air Traffic
Control Services Continuation Act of
1977, ending a strike which was permitted
to continue for a much longer time before
being halted!)-.Jlad included a provision
that, once the back-to-work law came into
force, the leadership of the union involved
was to give notice to the rank and file that
any declaration, authorization and direction to go on strike which had been issued
prior to the back-to-work legislation had
now become invalid. These sections had
escaped notic~ because they were either
obeyed or, if not so obeyed, were disregarded by the government. But not this
time.
When the unprecedented action of
legislating strikers back to work before
there was any sign of economic or other
crisis was taken, CUPW held meetings all
over the country to denounce the legislation. Workers did not obey . it. Picket
lines, supported by many non-postal
workers, were thrown up about Post Office work sites. The government, by its
_abuse of power, had sown the seeds of
civil disobed~llce. in this
the true

-colltext,-

, pOSTA(
WORKERS

ON

'sf Rill,
C.U.P.W.

I

I

I

I I

purpose of the prov1s1on enforcing ·an
obligation on the union leadership which in previous statutes had escaped
notice - was made manifest. The legislature had obviously understood that, if it
gave power to strike, it was giving an important right to workers which ought not
to be removed at will; and that, if it did
decide to remove it, it might have to cope
with understandably angry people. Therefore it would be advisable to have those
whom the workers trusted do the dirty
work for. the government. That is, it
would be more than useful if the workers'
leaders would tell the workers to return to
work, to explain to workers that their
much- cherished Fig!H to withhold their
labour ougg_Lnot, thjs time; to be insisted
on. It is beca'Use Jean~Claude Parrot refused to do this thathe was convicted and
sentenced to a term of imprisonment'. It is
because Jean-Claude Parrot refused to tell
the workers to obey an oppressive law fairly so characterized even if legally
passed - that the government.'s abuse of
power was revealed to the workers.
That the government, having with
great bravado rushed the legislation
through Parliament, sought to hide the
fact that it was in truth oppressing workers can be gleaned from several facts. One
was that the government spokespersons
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kept on insisting that, in reality, few of
the workers were supporting the leadership even though· the strike votes held·
showed the opposite. Similarly, the government insisted that only intimidation
kept WQrkers from returning to work after
the back-to-work legislation had ·been
passed. Most importantly, when the government decided to do something, it attacked the legality of the. picket lines. That
is, it did not proceed to prosecute unwilling workers as it had, by its special
drafting of Bill C-8, threatened it would
do. It is our view that it avoided doing so
because, by carrying out its threat, it
would have made it clear to Canadians
that there had been an overreaching and a
wrongful use of legal power. Thus, the
government sought injunctions in provincial courts to have the pickets removed
from Post Office sites on the basis that
they offended provincial law. The government's anger at having been forced into
this position was shown when subsequently it charged Jean-Claude Parrot for
not having done its work for it, namely, to
get the angry workers back on the job.
The nature of the offence with which he
was charged (and how he was charged)
provides even more evidence of the extent
to which the so-called freedoms of the
Canadian people can be overridden by a
. wilful government.
Jean-Claude Parrot was actually
charged with the offence of not saying
anything. The enormity of this cannot be
exaggerated. He was charged with not
telling CUPW members that the previously legal strike was now invalid. To
comprehend this, consider the following.
A government declares war. It passes an
Act of Parliament, ordering all workers to
participate ·in war production. A union
leader, who is also a conscientious objector, is charged with not having told his
union members to participate in the war
effort, although he has done nothing to
prevent the \\')Orkers from doing so. If the
government prosecuted this union leader
on the basis of a provision in the Act
which imposed such an obligation on
union leaders, would we not recognize
that such a prosecution of a conscientious
objector offended one of the most basic
aspects of our society, the right to hold
any belief whatsoever, provided that one
does not actively undermine the very essence of the State itself? The right to free
speech is always seriously circumscribed,
even in relatively democratic societies.
The right to hold private views, however,
should never be under restraint. To force
a person to speak against his/ her beliefs is
monstrous. In the midst of a war, the
Supreme Court of the United States held
that persons could not be forced to salute
the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance if that offended their conscience.
Yet that is precisely the kind of thing the
government sought to make Jean-Claude
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Parrot do. He believed his union members
ought to be allowed to strike. He possibly
hoped that they would disobey the legislature. Be probably believed he would be
betraying the trust they had piaced iri him
if he told them that they should regard all
that had been done, and done legally, as
invalid'. For his refusal to act against his
conscience, the government brought
criminal charges against Jean-Claude
Parrot. How would this government have
reacted to St. Thomas More?
·It is important to slow the flow of
argument a little to make a particularly
important point. When the initial use of
labour power is illegal and it has been engendered or supported by the union's
leaders, it makes sense to hold those leaders personally responsible to redress the
situation. This is so because it will be the
union as such rather than the workers
who, as a matter of law, will be in breach
of the existing collective agreement. But,
where the breach of tii:e agreement is
caused by another party (this time the
government) it becomes startling to hold
the union leadership responsible to undo
the mess created by that other party. If
Jean-Claude Parrot had urged CUPW
members not to obey the back-to-work
law, and if the government had prosecuted him for such conduct we would
have considered it malicious but we could
not have made a real argument that the
government was doing something which
was legally and morally unacceptable. But
the government did not do this. Maybe it
had no evidence that Jean-Claude Parrot
had so acted, or maybe it simply was not
interested in having him punished for such
conduct because the penalties under the
back-to-work legislation for encouraging
workers to stay out of work were merely
monetary ones. It is this aspect of the
government's legislation which draws attention to the offensive nature of the legislation and to the viciousness of its action
under that legislation: to positively encourage a continuation of what was once
a valid strike was made a lesser offence
than to obey one's conscience and to refuse to positively help the government
carry out its oppressive orders. '
Jean-Claude Parrot, then, was
charged with defying a law which asked
him to speak against his conscience. He
was not charged, as the press has misleadingly suggested to the public, with defying
the law by encouraging CUPW to refuse
to obey Bill C-8.
Thus we have before us the second
demonstration of the fragility of our civil
liberties in the hands of a government
which knows how to use the letter of the
law,· and which does not care about the
spirit which is meant to give life to that letter. Because distortion is required to
abuse legal power in this way, the government's actions also had the effect of forcing the courts and the judicial process in-

to unacceptable positions. ·
As we have seen, Bill C-8 providecj
for stiffer penalties for workers than the~~
Public Service Staff Relations Act did,~.
but even so these penalties were only}
monetary fines. The section which pro-}
vided that union leaders were obliged to'·
tell their membership to disregard
vious authorization to strike had no
tion attached to it. The government nonetheless was able to lay a charge
Jean-Claude Parrot. It did this under section 115 of the Criminal Code which pro.
vides that anyone who has contravened a
law of the Parliament of Canada which
does not provide for a penalty for such a
breach, will be guilty of an offence and
liable to a jail term of up to two years. Bill
C-8 was allegedly breached, and the relevant section of Bill C-8 did not provide a
penalty. Three points can be made to
show how a strict, literal interpretation of
the law can - and in this case did - make
a mockery of the justice system which we
are taught to believe protects individuals
from others and, in particular, from the
State:
When Jean-Claude "Parrot was asked
to come to court to face the charge, he
was granted bail, but only on fulfilling a
condition. This condition, set by the presiding judge, was that he had to make a
public statement that all previous declarations, authorizations and directions to go
on strike were now invalid. That is, the
State, through its independent judicial
arm (no doubt acting with propriety and
in good faith) forced, under the threat
of imprisonment, a man to speak against
his conscience. Note again how vicious
this was: at that point there was not a person in the land, let alone a striking CUPW
member, who did not know that the
strike had been made illegal. Jean-Claude
Parrot had to be humiliated to hide the
government's excesses!
4

The trial itself continued this process.
A presiding judge has power to control
the courtroom so that the decorum lends
itself to sober and· wise public decisionmaking, but was it necessary to insist, as
Chief Justice Evans did, that Jean-Claude
Parrot remove a button from his lapel
which said: "The struggle continues"?
Was it likely that the button would lead to
unruly behaviour, or was there in fact a
fear that jurors might be led to think that
there was more involved than a technical
breach of the law? To support this supposition note that, when addressing the
jury, the trial judge thought it necessary
to remind it that Jean-Claude Parrot was
on trial, not the government, and that if
the jurors felt that the government had
tnisbehaved, they could vote against it at
the next election. All technically correct,
but again revealing that the law had been
used by the government in the most cynical of ways and that a citizen of Canada
was to pay for this sin.

The third point to be made about the
distorting of the judicial process arising
. from the initial misuse of legislative power
by the government, relates to the fact that
Jean-Claude Parrot was charged under
section 115 of the Criminal Code. This
again describes the very political and selfindulgent attitude parliamentarians of
Canada have towards the legal system. We
citizens assume the legal system is there to
protect our rights. To the parliamentarians it is merely a political tool to
achieve their ends, even if this means
overriding the very rights claimed to be
protected.
Recently section 115 of the Criminal
Code was used in another context. When
the premises of the Agence Presse Libre
de Quebec were broken into by the
RCMP, the RCMP also took some documents away. That is, they were potentially
criminally responsible for breaking and
entering and theft. A very senior member
of the RCMP (and two other local police
officers) involved in these events were
permitted to plead guilty in May, 1977 to a
charge under section 115 brought by the
then Liberal government of Quebec. Instead of charging them with the very
serious offences of breaking and entering
and stealing (maximum fourteen years
imprisonment) they were actually charged
with .not obtaining a warrant! The section
of the Criminal Code which provides that
a warrant must be obtained to enter citizens' premises has no penalty attached,
and thus a section 115 offence has been
committed because there had been a contravention of a law of Canada. After a
few laudatory remarks from the presiding
judge who had made this finding, the
RCMP officer was given an absolute discharge. That is, no criminal conviction
was registered at all! If he had been
charged with breaking and entering and
theft, no matter how light the penalty imposed would have been, an absolute discharge could not - as a matter of law-·
have been given. The different uses to
which section 115 of the Criminal Code
was put in these two cases is dramatically
revealing. To underscore this, note that
Jean-Claude Parrot, when charged under
section 115, was sentenced to three
months' imprisonment plus eighteen
months' probation, plus a talking-to by the
presiding judge about the evil nature of his
behaviour. The lady holding the scales of
justice is, indeed, blind.
Throughout this discussion we have
assumed that everything done by the government and the courts was technically
correct. But, in as much as this assumption is correct, it is only so because in this
country we are, despite everything we say
to the contrary, so contemptuous of fundamental rights that we have made a
mockery of our Bill of Rights. We have
done so deliberately, interpreting it HS if it
no value, thereby reaching the legal
Position that the government can force

people to speak against their will without
offending what, to a trusting citizen, must
seem to be ringing and unambiguous
statutory provisions which are often
praised by our politicians when they compare our society favourably with nasty
authoritarian regimes. The Bill of Rights
provides:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have
existed and shall continue to exist
without discrimination by reason of
race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms,
namely,
(b) the right of the individual to
equality before the law and protection of the law;
(c) freedom of religion;
(d) freedom of speech;
(e) freedom of assembly and association; and
(f) freedom of the press.
Also Canada has ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
which came into force on 23 March 1976,
together with its Optional Protocol. The
Covenant' undertakes to protect people by
law against cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. It recognizes freedom of
thought, conscience and religion, freedom
of opinion and expression; the right of
peaceful assembly and of emigration; and

latures'I Can this kind of reading be
defended on the basis that it is necessary to- ..
leave full power with a legislature which, iff
it exceeds its powers, can be held account~ <~
able by the voters? Certainly, the United :
States has not accepted this. There it has been
authoritatively held that, only where a
"clear and present danger" to the survival
of the nation is to be avoided, may fundamental freedoms be abrogated. Thus, the
United States Supreme Court has stated:·
A system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and
ideological issues must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline
to foster such concepts. The right to
speak and the right to refrain from
speaking are complementary components of the broader concepts of
"individual freedom of mind. "
(Wooley v. Maynard 97S.Ct. 1428
(1977)
And also:
If there is any fixed s,tar in our
constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can
It is hard to see how our freedomprescribe what shall be orthodox in
loving courts and legislatures could permit
politics, nationalism, religion, or
principles of this kind to be interpreted so
other matters of opinion or force
narrowly as to uphold, as a valid exercise
citizens to confess by word or act
of power, legislation which forces people to
· their faith therein. If there are any
speak against their conscience. Whatever
circumstances which permit an exlawyers may feel about such technical inception, they do not occur to us.
terpretation, should Canadians not be told
(Mr. Justice Jackson in West Virthat neither their Bill of Rights, nor the
ginia State Board of Education et
cherished values which legislatures say they
al v. Barnette et. al. 319 U.S. 624
respect, can in any way bind those legisfreedom of association. Thus:
A1·ticl£n8
1. Eve1yone shall have the right to
freedom of thought, conscience a'nd
religion. This right shall include
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
Article 19
1. Eve1yone shall have the right to
hold opinions without inte1jerence.
2. Eve1yone shall have the right to
freedom of expression: this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing or
in print, in the form of art, or
tlfrough any other· media of his
choice.

(1942).

LOOKING BACKWARDS
Norman Nathan

i'can only marvel at·the author:
no two in the audience receive
identical programs, they sit
at different angles from the stage:
there's no agreement when to applaud
and during intermissions they talk
as if none were seeing the same play;
even the stage seems unreal
with all heroes in the orchestra
surrounded by villains,
each alone knowing his part
which others misinterpret
how the participants can sleep,
eat, put on a play together
without murdering in the fust scene
is a mystery, as life cries out
at the quick climax of being born
followed only by a long falling
action toward death
it's worth a thought
that (just as eyes see upside down)
deity views our doings in reverse
with graves foreshadowing there will be unbirth
when two share the same blood and breath and food
'
in the warmth of the womb
or join like sperm and egg
for united good
14 rnnnrlinn
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Thus, in: the United States it seems
that a replica of the Canadian Bill C-8
would have been held invalid in as much
as it forced someone to speak and adhere
to a view imposed by the State. In Canada, a land where similar values are supposedly aspired to with at least as much
vehemence and vigour, Bill C-8 was not
only accepted as valid but its legitimacy
was not even seriously questioned.
The CUPW and Jean-Claude Parrot
affair is probably not the most important
event in our history. But it is instructive.
It tells us that, to protect our freedoms,
we are required to put our faith solely in
the electoral process. Anything that is cor- ·
rectly implemented (in the sense of meeting our governing procedures) by our
legislatures is likely to be treated as a legitimate exercise of power. The potential for
abuse, as in the Jean-Claude Parrot case,
is obvious. It is easy for politicians to
justify the use of State force in such a
society against the members of that
society. At this time in Canadian history
this is a frightening thought. The use of
the law, as approved of in the JeanClaude Parrot case, was not merely an injustice to one group and one person. H
was a warning to all of us who believed
that we had certain inviolate freedoms. 0.
Harry Glasbeek and Michael Mandel·
teach at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.

